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CASE NOTES
the effect of the decision may serve to encourage more effective
union action to eliminate discrimination. Union leaders would likely
decide that it was in their best interest to be a party to any negotia-
tions, and they would attempt to take the lead in efforts to eliminate
discrimination. This result would be more in keeping with the
emphasis our national labor policy places on collective bargaining.
HELEN S. RAKOVE
institutional Law—Eleventh Amendment Bars Enforcement of
Fair Labor Standards Act Against States in Federal
Courts—Employees of the Department of Public Health & Welfare,
State of Missouri v. Department of Public Health & Welfare, State
of Missouri.'—The petitioners, employees of Missouri.state hospi-
tals and training schools, brought an action under the Fair Labor
Standards Act (FLSA) 2
 in the United States District Court for the
Western District of Missouri, seeking to recover back overtime
wages, an equal amount of liquidated damages, and attorneys' fees.
Sustaining the defendants' motion to dismiss based upon the
Eleventh Amendment, the district court found that this was an
action unconsented to by the State of Missouri, and thus was barred
by the Eleventh Amendment to the United States Constitution. 3
This decision was reversed by the United States Court of Ap-
peals for the Eighth Circuit, sitting in a three-judge pane1. 4 Defen-
dants petitioned for a rehearing, whereupon the court, sitting en
banc, set aside the decision of the panel and affirmed the decision of
the district court granting the motion to dismiss. 5 In affirming the
district court's decision, the Eighth Circuit stated that this suit was
barred by the original Constitution as well as the Eleventh Amend-
ment, unless the state consented to suit or waived its immunity. 6
Refusing to recognize any congressional power under the commerce
clause 7
 to expressly lift a state's Eleventh Amendment immunity,
the court emphasized that the State of Missouri had not agreed to
' 411 U.S. 279 (1973).
I 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-19 (1970):
3 See 452 F.2d 820, 822 (8th Cir. 1971). The district court opinion is unreported.
The Eleventh Amendment states:
The Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit
in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by
Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State.
U.S. Const. amend. XI.
4 Civil No. 20,204 (8th Cir,, April 2, 1971) (unreported).
5
 452 F.2d 820 (8th Cir. 1971).
Id. at 823, citing Great Northern Life Ins, Co. v. Reid, 322 U.S. 47 (1944); Missouri v.
Fiske, 290 U.S. 18 (1933); Ex parte New York, 256 U.S. 490 (1921); Hans v. Louisiana, 134
U.S. 1 (1889). :
U.S. Const. art. 1, § 8, cl. 3.
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submit itself to resolution of this dispute in a federal forum, nor had
it impliedly waived its immunity under the constructive waiver test
set out in Parden v. Terminal Railway of the Alabama State Docks
Department. 8
Recognizing a conflict in the courts of appeals 9 as to whether
state employees can sue their own state employers in the federal
courts under the 1966 amendments to the FLSA, the Supreme Court
granted certiorari.'° Justice Douglas, writing for the majority,
stated that the central issue was whether Missouri had impliedly
waived its immunity by continuing to operate its hospitals after the
1966 amendments. Since the Court had previously upheld the con-
stitutionality of the FLSA as extended to the states by the 1966
Amendments," the only remaining question was whether there had
been consent to suit in the federal forum. The Court, in an 8-1
decision, HELD: Missouri did not impliedly waive its immunity,
and thus the Eleventh Amendment barred the employees' suit in
federal court."
This decision raises grave doubts about the ability of state
employees to enforce their federally created rights in the federal
courts. Moreover, it poses serious questions about the very power of
Congress to create these rights when the activity sought to be
regulated is one in which a state is engaged. The most significant
aspects of the decision, however, are the Supreme Court's failure to
explain the relationship between sovereign immunity and the
Eleventh Amendment, and the failure to impart clarity to the con-
cept of waiver.
This note will first examine the ELSA, its 1966 amendments
and the Supreme Court decision which sustained the constitutional-
ity of the amendments. Since sovereign immunity and the Eleventh
Amendment are intertwined in the holding of Employees, the histor-
ical development of the two doctrines will be traced, and the effect
which they should have had upon this decision will be evaluated.
Then, this note will analyze the theory of implied waiver of immu-
nity as pronounced in Parden and the attempts of the majority to
distinguish that case from Employees. Because the concurring jus-
tices felt that the situation in Employees demanded an analysis far
different from that given by the majority, the opinion of Justice
Marshall will be dealt within depth. The treatment urged by Justice
Brennan in his dissent will then be compared to both the majority
and concurring opinions. Finally, this note will seek to examine the
377 U.S. 184 (1964). See 452 F.2d at 825.
9 Compare Employees with Briggs v. Sagers, 424 F.2d 130 (10th Cir.), ceri. denied, 400
U.S. 829 (1970). In this case, the Tenth Circuit found that Utah had impliedly consented to
suit in a federal forum under the test pronounced in Parden. The Briggs case was based upon
the identical statute and a parallel fact situation to that in Parden.
" 405 U.S. 1016 (1972),
II See Maryland v, Wirtz, 392 U.S. 183 (1968).
12
 411 U.S. 279 (1973). Justice Marshall, joined by Justice Stewart, concurred in the
result. See id. at 287. The lone dissenter was Justice Brennan. See id. at 298.
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practical ramifications of Employees upon the enforcement of feder-
ally created rights.
THE FLSA AMENDMENTS OF 1966
The Fair Labor - Standards Act of 1938 13 was aimed primarily
at improving the lot of America's working class by protecting them
from the debilitating effects of long working hours at excessively low
rates of compensation. 14 By prescribing a minimum wage" and
limiting the hours of work allowable at the minimum rate," Con-
gress felt that this goal could be achieved. However, it became
increasingly apparent to Congress that too many industries were
outside the scope of the statute, and, as a result, too many workers
were left unprotected."
Consequently, in 1966 Congress passed certain amendments
which extended the definition of "employer" to include a state,
when that state is operating a hospital, institution or school." Thus,
employees of state-run hospitals, institutions and schools were ex-
tended the benefits of the minimum wage and overtime compensa-
tion. Under the remedial provision of the original Act, i° a suit to
recover unpaid overtime compensation may be brought in "any
court of competent jurisdiction." 20
As Justice Douglas acknowledged in his majority opinion in the
Employees case, 21 the State of Missouri is constitutionally within the
scope of the 1966 amendments. This conclusion is based upon the
Supreme Court's decision in Maryland v. Wirtz, 22 wherein Mary-
land, along with twenty-seven other states, sought to enjoin the
Secretary of Labor from enforcing the FLSA as it extended to the
states. The states' major contention was that state-run institutions
were beyond the reach of the commerce clause and that the amend-
ments were a disguised attempt to invade state sovereignty. Reject-
ing this argument, the Wirtz Court explained that the amendments
merely sought to place the states on the same footing as private
employers engaged in similar activities. 23 The federal government,
it,said, was acting within a delegated power and was therefore
capable of overriding the countervailing state interest, whether that
' 3
 Ch. 676, 52 Stat. 1060 (1938), codified at 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-19 (1970).
14 Ch. 676, § 2, 52 Stat. 1060 (1938), codified at 29 U.S.C. § 202 (1970).
15 Ch. 676, § 6, 52 Stat. 1062 (1938), codified at 29 U.S.C. § 206 (1970).
16 Ch. 676, § 7, 52 Stat. 1063 (1938), codified at 29 U.S.C.	 § 207 (1970).
17
 For the testimony of former Secretary of Labor Wirtz before the Senate Subcommittee
on Labor, see S. Rep. No. 1487, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 8 (1966), reprinted in U.S. Code Cong.
& Ad. News 3003 (1966).
1 ° 29 U.S.C. § 203(d) (1970).
19 Ch. 676, § 16, 52 Stat. 1069 (1938), codified at 29 U.S.C. § 216 (1970).
213 Ch. 676, § 16(b), 52 Stat. 1069 (1938), codified at 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) (1970).
21
 411 U.S. at 283.
22
 392 U.S. 183 (1968).
23
 See id. at 193-95.
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interest be "governmental" or "proprietaiy." 24
 "If a State is engag-
ing in economic activities that are validly regulated by the Federal
Government when engaged in by private persons, the State too may
be forced to conform its activities to federal regulation." 25
THE' DOCTRINE OF SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY AND THE ELEVENTH
AMENDMENT
•
Since the states have been held to be' regulated by the FLSA,
one might easily conclude that state employees would be able to
enforce their rights in a federal court. However, the doctrines of
Eleventh Amendment and sovereign immunity serve to complicate
what would otherwise be a simple matter. Since the Supreme Court
-did not clearly differentiate these two distinct theories in
Employees, 26 a preliminary examination of the two doctrines is
appropriate.
Sovereign immunity is a remnant of the feudal law of Europe;
it has commonly and somewhat mistakenly been characterized by
the phrase "the King can do no wrong." 27 In effect, it did not block
a suit against the crown; rather, it dictated the procedural form of
the legal action available to the wronged subject. 28 It has been
suggested that Madison and some of the other framers of the Con-
stitution never considered the problem at al1. 29 On the other hand,
Hamilton believed that the common law doctrine was left undis-
turbed by the framing of the Constitution. 3° However, it appears
that the prevailing mood at that time favored national unity, and,
24 Id. at 195, citing Sanitary District v. United States, 266 U.S. 405 (1925).
25 392 U.S. at 196-97.
26 See text fallowing note 12 supra.
" See, e.g., Kawananakoa v. Polyblank, 205 U.S. 349, 353 (1907) (Holmes, J.). What
this concept originally denoted was that the king, as origin of the law, must not and is not
entitled to do any wrong. See Jaffe, Suits Against Governments and Officers: Sovereign
Immunity, 77 Harv. L. Rev. I, 4-8 (1963). It is suggested that the distortion was a result of
the refusal of the King to be held liable through the doctrine of respondeat superior. Id. at 8.
28 Jacobs, The Eleventh Amendment and Sovereign Immunity 6 (1972). "The immunity
doctrine by this time [1700) was largely a legal conception, which determined the forms of
procedure ... but did not seriously impair the subject's right to recovery in accordance with
the substantive law." Id. Professor Jaffe points out:
Perhaps the question has been not whether the doctrine of sovereign immunity was.
"right" but whether as a practical matter it ever has existed, From time immemorial
many claims affecting the Crown could be pursued in the regular courts if they did
not take the form of a suit against the Crown . ; .. Long before 1789 it was true that
sovereign immunity was not a bar to relief. Where the doctrine was in form-
applicable the subject had to proceed by petition of right, a cumbersome, dilatory
remedy ... , but nevertheless a remedy.
Jaffe, supra note 27, at 1,
• The concept is further confused by attempting to superimpose it upon the American
state-federal scheme. Removed from its monarchist context, it is difficult to locate the ultimate
source of the law. Thus, the doctrine has indeed lost meaning.
29 Jacobs, supra note 28, at 12. Cf. 3 J. Elliot, Debates on the Federal Constitution 533
(2d ed. 1901).
" See, e.g.,' The Federalist No. 81 (A. Hamilton).
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therefore, the autonomy of the individual states was not a considera-
tion of overriding importance. 31 The main objective of the Constitu-
tional Convention was to insure; domestic harmony between the
states, and the realization of that goal required the availability of an
impartial federal tribunal to resolve claims between a citizen of one
state and another state. 32 Therefore it would seem that the framers
would not have contemplated that federal jurisdiction could be
defeated by invoking this common law doctrine. 33 There are several
factors which would tend to support the hypothesis that the First
Congress deemed the states to be amenable to suit in the federal
forum. 34 , These factors include the previously stated objective of
domestic tranquility among the several states, a concern for the
fidelity of the states to their financial obligations, and the necessity
of a forum in which one state could sue another. 35 On the other
hand, it has been argued that "it was evidently the consensus 'of the
participants that the sovereign immunity should survive the new
Constitution, and . . . also ... that the immunity would survive." 36
Amidst an atmosphere of debtor states fearing constant suit in
the federal courts to enforce fulfillment of their financial obligations
arising out of the Revolutionary War, Chisholm v. Georgia 37 was
decided. In that case, the Supreme Court refused to recognize the
defense of sovereign immunity as precluding a suit by a resident of
South Carolina against the State id Georgia in the federal courts.
Chief Justice Jay ,reasoned• that since sovereignty resides in the
people, Georgia should not be granted an immunity that is denied a
private person. 38
Immediately there arose a clamor for a constitutional amend-
ment; debtor states feared that they would become endlessly sub-
merged in suits in foreign federal forums. The EleventhAmendment
was passed with minimal opposition, but its ratification did not
clearly indicate whether the states were merely affirming an original
understanding ignored by the Chisholm court (i.e., that the doctrine
of sovereign immunity already existed and protected \a, state from
suit without that state's consent) or whether it was simply an expe-
dient to 'avert crushing financial demands upon the states. 39 Evi-
31 Jacobs, supra note 28, at 13.
32 See id. at 15-18.
33 Id. at 12-13. See also Warren, New Light on the History of the Federal Judiciary Act
of 1789, 37 Harv. L. Rev. 49, 83 (1923). Cf. Cullison, Interpretation of the Eleventh
Amendment, 5 Houston L. Rev. 1, 7-8 (1967).
34 Jacobs, supra note 28, at 42.
35 Id. at 22-23.
36 Cullison, supra note 33, at 9 (emphasis added). See also.1 C. Warren, The Supreme
Court in United States History 91 (rev. ed. 1947).
37 2 U.S. (2 Dalt.) 419 (1793).
38 Id. at 470-73.
39 This might be characterized as a matter of federalism. In other words, the Supreme
Court and the Congress were not willing to invoke the federal judicial power in a situation
wherein to do so would practically insure the financial destruction of a state.
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dence of the former interpretation appears on the face of the
Eleventh Amendment: "The Judicial power .. . shall not be con-
strued to extend . . . ."4° This language would seem to indicate that
the Amendment merely corrects a misinterpretation by the Court in
Chisholm. On the other hand, "[t]he ratification debates . . . do not
indicate any general understanding that the states were to retain
their sovereign immunity . . ."41 Neither Article III nor arguably
.the Amendment itself speaks in terms of sovereign immunity;
rather,• they speak of federal "judicial power." Moreover, the
amendment is framed in,absolute terms. While sovereign immunity
was capable of being waived at the option of the sovereign, the
Eleventh Amendment apparently goes beyond the common law
doctrine, since the possibility of waiver is not mentioned, Thus; the
Eleventh Amendment might justifiably be characterized as a simple
ad hoc expedient rather than a reaffirmation of sovereign immunity.
In other words, it was merely a decision that no state would be
made bankrupt with the aid of the federal judicial power.
Disregarding the motivations behind ratification of the
Eleventh Amendment, it appears that the Amendment would have
no effect upon the present suit. Upon a literal construction of the
Eleventh Amendment, the suit in Employees would not be barred,
for in this .
 instance the citizens were suing their own state in a
federal court, not another state. However, as the majority opinion
properly indicates, Hans v. Louisiana," decided in 1890, extended
the Eleventh Amendment bar to cover this situation as well The
Hans Court reasoned that logic demanded this result; 43 otherwise an
anomalous situation would have existed: although the federal courts
were closed to a suit by a citizen of state A against state B, that
same citizen could sue state A in the federal courts. This conclusion
is probably correct in light of the Eleventh Amendment bar. 44 It
must be noted, however, that the decision in Hans was based upon
the premise that sovereign immunity had been contemplated at the
time of the ratification of the Constitution and had intentionally
been incorporated into it. The opinion speaks not in terms of con-
4° U.S. Const. amend. XI (emphasis added). For the full text of the Amendment, see
note 3 supra.
41
 Jacobs, supra note 28, at 68, See also Cullison, supra note 33, at 14. It is there
proposed that fear of numerous suits in federal forums motivated ratification of the amend-
ment.
42
 134 U.S. I (1890).
43 Id. at 15. Upon analysis of the underlying rationale for the use of the federal court
system in diversity cases, the Court's reasoning in Hans appears cogent. A major purpose for
the availability of the federal forum is to allow a claim by a citizen of a foreign state to be
heard by an arguably more impartial tribunal than would be the case if the suit was
entertained in the court of the defendant's home state. If this concern was considered to be
less weighty than the rationale underlying the Eleventh Amendment, what reason would there
be for allowing a citizen to sue his own state in federal court when the dangers of a hostile
state court' are considerably less?,
44 See Jacobs, supra note 28, at 110.
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straint upon the judicial power, but in terms of the common law
immunity. The Court relied upon Hamilton's Federalist Papers: "It
is inherent in the nature of sovereignty not to be amenable to-the
suit of an individual without its [the state's] consent."45 The Court
went on to say: "The suability of a ,State without its consent was a
thing unknown to the law."46 The Hans Court thus ascribed to the
framers of the Constitution an intent to incorporate sovereign im-
munity. This conclusion, however, is not clearly ascertainable from
either judicial pronouncement or historical inquiry.
Although the majority in Employees did not find it necessary to
distinguish between the two doctrines of Eleventh Amendment im-
munity and sovereign immunity, Justice Marshall points out in his
concurring opinion47 that there are two separate doctrines. More
important, a final adjudication of the petitioners' claim depends
upon a clear indication of whether their suit was barred in federal
court because of the Eleventh Amendment or because of sovereign
immunity. If the Court has said that sovereign immunity bars this
suit, then the same doctrine will serve to block this action in the
state courts of Missouri, If, on the other hand, this action was
dismissed upon the 'basis of the jurisdictional requirements of the
Eleventh Amendment (and the practical considerations required to
protect the delicate balance inherent in a federalist system), then the
state court might still be available for enforcement of this claim. If
the former approach was used, then the Supreme Court may have
invoked the common law doctrine of dubious historical origins
which will render unenforceable certain rights which it had previ-
ously recognized as constitutionally sound.
WAIVER OF IMMUNITY: Parden v. Terminal Railway of the Alabama
State Docks Department
Accompanying the doctrine of: sovereign immunity is the con-
cept, first pronounced in Cohens v. Virginia," that immunity can be
waived upon the consent of the sovereign. It is difficult to square
that doctrine with the absolute prohibition in the language of the
Eleventh Amendment. 49
 Constitutional history has confronted us
45
 The Federalist No. 81 (A. Hamilton), as quoted in Hans, 134 U.S. at 13.
46 134 U.S. at 15-16, Justice Brennan suggests in Employees that although the suit in
Hans was defended on Eleventh Amendment grounds, the Hans opinion should not have
been addressed to that amendment, but solely to the concept of immunity, and therefore the
Eleventh Amendment is not applicable to the facts in Employees. 411 U.S. at 313-15, See text
following note 116 infra.
47 411 U.S. at 287.
48 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264 (1821).
49 In Minnesota v. Hitchcock, 185 U.S. 373 (1902), the Court inquired into the existence
of jurisdiction to hear a suit instituted by the State of Minnesota, even though both parties
urged the Court to proceed on the merits of the case. The Court said: "[T] he express consent
of the parties [would not} give to this court a jurisdiction which was not warranted by the
Constitution and laws." Id. at 382. Although not a case arising under the Eleventh Amend-
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with a curious situation: although the federal courts do not have the
jurisdiction to hear a suit of this nature, the jurisdictional bar is
removed upon the granting of consent . by the state. This peculiar
result seems to violate the basic legal premise that a court without
the jurisdiction to hear a certain type of suit is prohibited from
entertaining the suit even if the litigants are willing to waive those
jurisdictional defects. This apparent contradiction can only be ex-
plained by the mixture of the Eleventh Amendment bar and the
feudal remnants of common law- immunity. Despite this lack of
sound historical or constitutional underpinnings, the doctrine of
waiver of Eleventh Amendment immunity has persisted since the
decision in Cohens.
, The Court viewed the crucial question in Employees as being
whether there has been a waiver of Eleventh Amendment immunity
by Missouri. 50
 Originally, waiver was required to be "an intentional
relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege." 51
The Court will indulge every reasonable presumption against a
finding that constitutional rights have been waived. 52 This strict
reading of waiver was, however, considerably watered down in the
case of Parden v. Terminal Railway of the Alabama State Docks
Department," In that case, the state of Alabama answered an
action instituted by employees of its state-owned railroad under the
Federal Employers' Liability Act (FELA) 54
 by setting up the defense
of sovereign immunity based upon the Eleventh Amendment. Re-
jecting that argument, the Court held that
it remains the law that a State may not be sued .
without its consent. Our conclusion is simply that
Alabama, when it began operation of an interstate rail-
road, approximately 20 years after enactment of the
FELA, necessarily consented to such suit as was au-
thorized by that Act. By adopting and ratifying the Com-
merce Clause, the States empowered Congress to create
such a right of action against interstate railroads; by enact-
ing the FELA in the exercise of this power, Congress
conditioned the right to operate a railroad in interstate
commerce upon amenability to suit in federal court as
provided by the Act; by thereafter operating a railroad in
ment, this case stands for the general proposition that a jurisdictional bar cannot be waived as
to the subject matter even if both parties agree.
5° The Court does not clearly delineate whether its opinion is based upon the Eleventh
Amendment or upon sovereign immunity. However, since the appellee's motion to dismiss
was based upon the Eleventh Amendment, it seems that the Court found that doctrine to be
of crucial importance. -
" Johnson v. Zerbst; 304 U.S.'458,.464 (1938), concerning the Sixth Amendment right to
counsel.	 •
52 Id.
53 377 U.S. 184 (1964).
45 U.S.C. H 51-60 (1970).
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interstate commerce, Alabama must be taken to have ac-
cepted that condition and thus :to have consented to suit."
In other words, Congress, when acting within its delegated powers
such as the commerce power, may offer the state this alternative:
either consent to the.
 jurisdiction of the federal courts in actions
arising out of the regulated activity or else you may not engage in
that activity at all. This is because, the states surrendered a portion
of their sovereignty.
 when they gralted Congress the powpr to regu-
late commerce. 56 As can be seen in Parden, the state need not make
any express statement that it has agreed to be sued in the federal
forum; rather, by engaging in the regulated activity, the state is
assumed to have made its choice to submit to the federal jurisdic-
tion. Congress will offer the state the option, and if the state chooses
to operate within that regulated enterprise, the courts will infer the
waiver. Although the dissent in Parden required a clearer expression
of legislative intent to create such a choice than was found in the
FELA, it agreed that Congress might, in certain situations, "condi-
tion a State's permit to engage in the interstate transportation busi-
ness on a waiver of the State's sovereign immunity from suits arising
out of such business . . . ."57
 However, "the decision to impose such
a condition is for Congress and not for the courts." 58
 This doctrine is
a clear departure from previous Supreme Court pronouncements as
to the necessity of voluntary and knowing waiver of constitutional
rights. If Congress can condition the participation of the state upon
amenability to suit in the federal forum, then by no stretch of the
imagination might one call that waiver truly voluntary.
For analytical purposes, the majority opinion in Employees can
be viewed as posing two question with regard to the waiver con-
cept. The first question is whether there can be found in the 1966
amendments to the FLSA an expression of congressional intent to
confront the states with a Parden -type choice of either ceasing the
activity or consenting to suit in federal court. The second qu estion is
whether Congress has the power to create a Parden-type "take it or
leave it" choice in the Employees situation. Although the Court
never expressly speaks in terms of legislative power, this considera-
tion seems implicitly to permeate its decision. 59 In light of Wirtz, the
55 377 U.S. at 192 (emphasis added).
56
 Id.
57
 Id. at 198 (dissenting opinion).
58
 Id. (dissenting opinion).
59
 It merits notice that Justice Douglas dissented in Wirtz, arguing that the 1966 FLSA
amendments contravened the language of the Tenth Amendment. Implied in his dissenting
opinion in Wirtz is the notion that the standard to be applied in testing the validity of a
federal regulation affecting interstate commerce is the financial burden which is to be imposed
upon the state. 392 U.S. at 203-05 (dissenting opinion). 'There can thus be seen a predisposi-
tion of Douglas against the federal legislation involved in the principal case. However, it
appears questionable that a distinction should be drawn between federal regulations which
are "cheaply" complied with and those which involve greater expenditures of state funds. Yet
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majority could not very well rule that Congress lacked the power to
regulate a state activity under the FLSA; instead they seem to speak
of congressional power to force the state to appear in federal court.
The Employees case does not represent the first instance of state
employees seeking recovery from their own state-employer under the
1966 amendments to the FLSA. In Briggs v. Sagers," Utah citizens,
who were employees of a state-owned institution, •brought suit in
federal district court in Utah in order to enforce the Act's minimum
wage requirements. The district court' found that Utah had not
waived its immunity, and therefore it had no jurisdiction and dis-
missed the action.
Upon appeal, the Tenth Circuit characterized the issue as being
a confrontation between congressional regulation of commerce and
the state's rights under the Eleventh Amendment." The plaintiffs
based their case upon the theory of implied consent set forth in
Parden. The defendants sought to distinguish this case from Parden
on two grounds: first, that the regulated activity involved in this
instance was governmental rather then proprietary, and second,
that Utah cannot be said to have waived its immunity because it
was operating the institution prior to the enactment of the amend-
ments.
The Tenth Circuit rejected the first argument by pointing to
language in Wirtz which held insignificant the governmental pro-
prietary distinction, 62
 Although acknowledging that the defendants'
second argument might be somewhat convincing, the Tenth Circuit
refused to be influenced by it, since in Parden the State of Alabama
contended that it did not intend to waive its immunity, nor had it
known that such a waiver would result. The crucial fact in Parden
was that Alabama decided to operate a railroad in a field-regulated
by Congress, and that fact determined that it had impliedly waived
its immunity." The extent of the voluntariness in a Parden waiver
is that the state may cease the activity if it wishes to maintain its
immunity from suit in the federal courts.
THE MAJORITY OPINION: Parden AND Employees DISTINGUISHED
Faced with this inconsistency in circuit court decisions, the
Supreme Court confronted the problem in the Employees case.
Justice Douglas seemingly characterized the problem as being
twofold. First, has Congress actually intended that a Parden-type
this fear of financial burden based upon a cost-computation test pervades the majority opinion
in Employees.
60
 301 F. Supp. 1023 (D. Utah 1969), rev'd, 424 F.2d 130 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 400
U.S. 829 (1970).
61
 424 F.2d at 131.
62 Id. at 133.
63 Id. at 134, citing Parden, 392 U.S. at 195.
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decision be offered to the state?" Second, does Congress have the
power to confront the 'state with this choice in this type of situation?
He answered the first question in the negative on grounds which
appear dubious when compared with the factors which elicited the
opposite answer from the Court in the Parden case. Douglas relied
upon the language of section 16(b) of the Act, which states that an
action under the FLSA "may be maintained in any court of compe-
tent jurisdiction," 65
 and emphasized that this original language was
retained in the statute's post-1966 form. He reasoned that since a
federal court is not competent to render a judgment against a
non-consenting state, Congress would have changed the language of
the Act to specifically include the federal courts as a forum in which
to maintain such an action if it had indeed intended that the federal
courts would be accessible for this type of suit. Douglas searched for
some "clear language that the constitutional immunity was swept
away,"66 but he found none. 67 This view implies that the majority
found a clearer pronouncement of this legislative intent in the lan-
guage of the FELA, upon which the Parden action was based.
However, that language is seemingly much less explicit than the
language expressing the congressional intent in the 1966 amend-
ments to the FLSA. The wording of the FELA reflects that it was
not particularly directed toward the states. Rather, the relevant
portions are framed in quite general terms: "[E]very common carrier
by railroad while engaging in commerce between any of the several
states . . . shall be liable . . . ."68
 From this apparently general
directive, the Parden Court concluded: "Congress, in making the
FELA applicable to 'every' common carrier by railroad in interstate
commerce, meant what it said."69
If the Supreme Court found a sufficient congressional intent in
this language to justify the Parden decision, then it is difficult
to accept the argument that CongreSs did not intend to construct
the same choice when, it enacted the 1966 FLSA amendments. The
FLSA language, is expressly directed toward the states. - The
amendments state that the word "employer . . . shall not include
. . . any State or political subdivision. of a State (except with respect
to employees of a State . . . employed (1) in a hospital, institution, or
school . . .)."7° As Justice Marshall pointed out in his concurring
opinion, "[i]n the face of such clear language, I find it impossible to
believe that Congress did not intend to extend the full benefit of the
provisions of the FLSA to these state employees." 71 The "full
" 411 U.S. at 283.
65
 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) (1970).
66
 411 U.S. at 285.
" Id.
65
 45 U.S.C. § 51 (1970).
69 377 U.S. at 187.
70
 29 U.S.C. § 203(d) (1970).
51 411 U.S. at 289 (concurring opinion) (emphasis in the original).
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benefit" includes, seemingly, the right to bring on FLSA action in a
federal forum, since an employee of a private institution was enti-
tied to do so. Justice Brennan, in his dissenting opinion, reacted to
the majority opinion by saying that "it is only the sheerest sort of
ritualism to suggest that Congress excluded the States from § 16(b)
suits [private suits instituted by individual employees] by not ex-
pressly referring to the States in 16(b)."72 In light of the Court's
holding in Parden, it does appear strange that the Employees Court
would emphasize this minor point in order to justify their finding
that Congress, in enacting the 1966 FLSA , amendments, did not
intend to confront the states with a Parden-type choice.
Moreover, if by continuing to operate within the regulated
activity, the state has waived its immunity to suit in federal court,
then the federal court does become a "court of competent jurisdic-
tion." In addition, the search for a clear congressional intent is not
even required by Parden. For the Parden majority, it is only neces-
sary that the state activity sought to be regulated is validly accessi-
ble through a delegated power in order that the states be confronted
with a choice of consenting to federal suit 'or else forgoing the
activity. 73 .
In answering the question of whether Congress intended that
the states be confronted with a Parden-type choice, the majority
also_ pointed out that section 16(c) 74
 empowers the Secretary• of
Labor to institute suits on behalf of state employees who have been
wronged by their employers under the statute. Justice Douglas sur-
mised that this is prima facie evidence that "private enforcement of
the Act was not .a paramount objective."75 Justice Douglas also
viewed section 16(c) as the primary basis for the majority's rebuttal
72 Id. at 303 (dissenting opinion).
" The dissent in Parden argued that "far from manifesting such an unequivocal deter-
mination, the legislative history of the [FELA] indicates that Congress did not even consider
the possible impact of its legislation upon state immunity from suit." Parden v. Terminal Ry.
of Alabama State Docks. Dep't, 377 U.S. 184, 199 (1964). By comparison, the express
statutory language and accompanying legislative history of the 1966 amendments to the FLSA
do "manifest an unequivocal determination," and they reflect - that Congress did "consider its
impact" upon the immunity of the states. The explicit language of the amendments and the
history might even be characterized as a premeditated response to the reservations of the
dissenting justices in Parden.
-It is quite possible that the Court was merely seeking in Employees to limit the effect of
the previous decision in Parden. However, to limit Parden on the basis of an absence of
congressional intent appears dubious. It is submitted that if Parden is to be limited, the line
drawn by Justice Marshall in his concurring opinion—i.e., "at least legal notice"—appears to
be much more compelling. See text following note 104 infra.
74 29 U.S.C. § 216(c) (1970). This section authcirizes "the Secretary of Labor . 	 . to
supervise the payment of the . . . unpaid overtime compensation owing to any employee
under section 207 . . . ."
75 411 U.S. at 286. As has been discussed above, see text at notes 67-69 supra, given the
premise that Congress was not silent to the waiver of sovereign immunity in the FELA
legislation which gave rise to the ruling in Parden, it is submitted that it is truly elusive
reasoning which leads the majority to conclude that Congress was silent as to waiver of
immunity in their 1966 amendments to the FLSA.
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to the allegation that' this has I created 9a right without any
remedy. "76 The Secretary of Labor; suing in the name of the United
States, would not be blocked by the Eleventh Amendment, and thus
the Court concluded that Congress was not primarily concerned
with allowing private citizens `to sue their state employers in the
federal courts.
However, if one examines the , logistics of the FLSA suits insti-
tuted by the Secretary of Labor under section 16(c), it would be
difficult to understand how Justice Douglas could conclude that
private enforcement was not a paramount objective. If the Secretary
of Labor were the sole means for getting a state hospital employee's
suit into the court, most, if not all, Of those similarly situated would,
in actuality, be faced with a right .without a remedy. In examining
the basic numbers involved in .having .the Secretary of Labor as
champion of all such claims in the federal courts, the Solicitor
General pointed out in his amicuS brief that "[i]n 1971 . . , less
than 4 per cent of these [state-run] establishments [could] be investi-
gated by the SeCretary each year."77 In the light of these statistics, it
seems that private enforcement, presuming it was constitutionally
acceptable, was the paramount objective of the Act. It would be
more reasonable to surmise from these figures that section 16(c) was
intended to be available as a last resort for those who cannot
otherwise gain access to the courts because of financial obstacles.
Closer scrutiny of section 16(c) reveals that once the Secretary
of Labor acts under the power assigned to him by the statute, the
petitioners waive the right to seek any other remedy under section
16(b). 78 Moreover, it should be noted that this section was not
aimed specifically at those employees who were brought within the
purview of the Act for the first time in 1966; rather, it is available to
"any employee or employees . .. under this title." 79 Section 16(c)
predated the , 1966 amendments. It is therefore difficult to conclude
that it was a remedy aimed specially to avoid the problems of
sovereign immunity inherent in a suit against a state-employer.
There is no language in either the statutes or the amendments which
either suggests that any remedy 'is limited to a certain class of
plaintiffs or that any class is prohibited from pursuing any remedy.
The Third Circuit has pointed out in Hodgson v. Wheaton
Glass CO° that the only situation in which the Secretary would
76 Id. at 287. Of course, the possibility exists that the right could be enforced by suit in
the state courts. However, the Court stated: "[T]hat is a question we need not reach." Id,
" Brief for the United States as Amicus' Curiae at 22-23, Employees of the Dep't of
Public Health & Welfare, State of Missouri v. Dep't of Public Health & Welfare, State of
Missouri, 411 U.S. 279 (1973).
"[T]he consent of any employee to the bringing of any such action ... shall constitute
a waiver by such employee of any right of action he may have under subsection (b), I' 29
U.S.C. § 216(c) (1970).
'9 29 U.S.C. § 216(c) (1970).
8° 446 F.2d 527 (3d Cir, 1971), a suit by the Secretary of Labor under 29 U.S.C. § 216(c)
(1970). See also Wirtz v. Marino, 405 F.2d 938 (1st Cir. 1969).
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invoke section 16(c) jurisdiction is the case of a suit requested by a
single employee. If this is indeed the case, then the section 16(e)
remedy would be unavailable to the petitioners in Employees, as
they sought enforcement of the Act through a class action.
Moreover, the Secretary is precluded from bringing suit on behalf of
employees when there is involved "an issue of law not yet finally
settled."" Hypothetically, the Employees suit could be rejected by
the Secretary on this basis, for it might be that the question of
overtime work in the hospital situation demands special treatment,
and the judiciary has never dealt with that question before. The
important point is that this proviso further limits the instances in
which the Secretary of Labor might bring the suit. In the language
of the statute, when a written request is filed with the Secretary to
enforce minimum wage or overtime requirements, "the Secretary
may bring an action." 82 As the dissent in the en bane decision of the
Eighth Circuit in Employees pointed out, "[t]he Secretary's interest
may not be identical to the personal interests of an individual
employee."83
 It might therefore be submitted that "[a] suit under
16(b) [the private suit] represents the only remedial provision of the
Act which assures him of having his claim presented to a court." 84
Thus, to answer the charge that the Court's decision in Employees
has in effect recognized a right without a remedy by pointing to the
availability of a section 16(c) suit is clearly a tenuous argument.
In answering the second question, i.e., whether in this instance
Congress has the power to force the states to make a Parden-type
choice, it appears that the Court must choose either to overrule
Parden
—thereby invalidating congressional power to force this
choice in any situation—or to sufficiently distinguish the two factual
situations to show that in Employees there was no power to force the
choice, while in Parden there was.
It would seem that once the decision has been made that
Congress did not intend to force the choice, there would be no need
to discuss whether there was power to do so. However, the majority
opinion does seem to conclude that in the Employees fact situation,
Congress would not have the power to create this "take it or leave
it" choice. There are several factors which led them to this conclu-
sion. First, they attached weight to the fact that while the state
activity in Parden was proprietary in nature, the state activity in
Employees was essential and governmental. It should be noted that
°I 29 U.S.C. § 216(c) (1970). For an example of such issues, see Wirtz v. Marino, 405
F.2d 938 (1st Cir. 1969). In that case, the issue of whether an employee was entitled to
overtime pay when he carried equipment in his car because no car was available to his
employer was held to be a controlling question of law and thus precluded the Secretary's
§ 216(c) suit. See also Schultz v. Jack Smith's Automatic Transmission Serv., Inc., 422
F:2d 104 (4th Cir. 1970).
S2 29 1.1. S. C. § 216(c) (1970) (emphasis added).
S3 452 F.2d 820, 833 (8th Cir. 1971) (dissenting opinion).
84 Id. (dissenting opinion).
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Congress aimed this legislation at both governmental and pro-
prietary state activities." Moreover, when the Supreme Court
was first compelled to deal with the constitutionality of this legisla-
tion in Wirtz, it stated that "pit is dear that the Federal Govern-
ment, when acting within a delegated power, may override counter-
vailing state interests whether these be described as 'governmental'
or 'proprietary' in character." 86 Perhaps it is possible that Congress,
while possessing the power to regulate within this sphere of activity
(as established in Wirtz), might nevertheless lack the power to
regulate the forum for enforcement of these rights by means of a
Parden-type choice when the regulated activity is of a governmental
rather than a proprietary nature. But the Parden Court established
that when Congress acts within a delegated power such as its power
to regulate interstate commerce, it may condition participation in
that activity upon amenability to suit in the federal courts. Thus,
this governmental-proprietary dichotomy appears to be a somewhat
tenuous basis for distinguishing Parden from Employees in light of
the previous Supreme Court decisions: Wirtz holds that the 1966
Amendments to FLSA are constitutionally permitted under the
commerce clause, and Parden holds' that if constitutionally sound,
the existence of regulations will force a state to forgo the activity or
else be subject to suit in federal court. •
Secondly, the majority opinion sought to distinguish the two
cases on the basis of the relative costs involved in state compliance
with the respective congressional mandates. The Couit appears to
have attached a high degree of significance to the "enormous fiscal
burdens on the States."87 But the Tenth Circuit, in Briggs, surmised
from the Act's legislative history" that "the overall purpose of the
FLSA tacitly suggests that the imposition of such strain is out-
weighed by the underlying policy of the Act." 89 Again, the Court
could find this congressional intent irrelevant in determining
whether Congress has the power to force the Parden choice, but it is
nevertheless somewhat disturbing that the Court found controlling
significance in the projected financial burden of complying with an
otherwise valid congressional regulation.
The third factor by which the majority sought to distinguish
Employees from Parden similarly examines the relative cost to the
states. While in Parden the petitioners merely sought compensation
under the FELA for actual damage, the employees of Missouri' were
seeking an equal amount of liquidated damages. 9° The Court
99 See S. Rep. No. 1487, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 8 (1966), reprinted in U.S. Code Cong. &
Ad. News 3002 (1966) [hereinafter cited as S. Rep. No. 1487].
96 Maryland v. Wirtz, 392 U.S. 183, 195 (1968).
99 411 U.S. at 284.
89 See S. Rep. No. 1487, supra note 85, at 3004.
89 Briggs, 424 F.2d at 134.
" This is in reference to 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) (1970): "Any employer who violates
section 206 or section 207 . • . shall be liable 	 in the amount of their unpaid minimum
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reasoned that although liquidated damages are available as a deter-
rent against private violation, the federalist system does not allow
Congress to treat the states in such a manner. 91 The Court could be
quite justified in saying that it is one thing to force a Parden-type
choice when the measure of damages which _flows from submitting
to the federal jurisdiction is purely compensatory, while it is quite
different to force a state to waive its immunity when it faces the
Possibility of being assessed punitive damages. However, the Court
set out in Brooklyn Savings Bank v.- 0Weil 92 that the liqui-.
dated damages clause of the remedial statute is compensatory and
not punitive. The Court reasoned there that it is difficult to assess
the exact amount of compensation beyond merely repaying the back
wages; since repayment alone will not suffice to enable the employee
to reach that minimum standard of living, an equal amount of
liquidated damages will be allowed. 93
Further, although there is case law on both sides of the ques-
tion, some courts have held that the assessment of liquidated dam-
ages against a noncomplying employer lies within the discretion of
the court. 94 The majority opinion seems to have disregarded these
previous judicial pronouncements when formulating this aspect of
their argument.
• To summarize, the majority has stated first that Congress did
not intend to confront the states with the Parden-type choice. Sec-
ondly, since Missouri's activity is governmental rather than pro-
prietary since it potentially involves a large expenditure of state
money in order to comply, and since the statute in question involves
the possible assessment of liquidated damages against a state, the
present operation of state schools and hospitals is not an activity as
to which the Congress has the power to force the states to confront
the two options.
wages, or their unpaid overtime compensation . and in an additional equal amount as
liquidated damages." [Emphasis added.]
91 See 411 U.S. at 286.
92 324 U.S. 697 (1945). See also Idaho Potato Growers v. NLRB, 144 F.2d 295 (9th
Cir.), cert. denied, 323 U.S. 769 (1944); Atlantic Co. v. Broughton, 146 F.2d 480 (5th Cir.
1944), cert. denied, 324 U.S. 883 (1945).
93
 Note, 17 Vill. L. Rev. 713, 720-21 (1972), suggests that
[s]ince the Supreme Court [in Barden) was willing to find constructive waiver of
immunity in order to give protection to a relatively small number of people 	 . even
where. Congress hid not made clear its desire that such protection be given, then a
fortiori constructive waiver is applicable where Congress has specifically applied
legislation to the states as employers, where the class of persons meant to be
protected is much greater, and where the purpose and need of regulation is a more
fundamental and pressing expression of congressional regulation of commerce.
" See, e.g., Brown v. Dunbar & Sullivan Dredging Co., 189 F.2d 871 (2d Cir. 1951);
Landaas v. Canister Co., 188 F.2d 768 (3d Cir. 1951). Contra, Atlantic Co. v. Broughton,
146 F.2d 480 (5th Cir. 1944). This factor apparently cuts both ways. On the one hand, if
assessment of liquidated damages is discretionary, then perhaps the issue of culpability does in
fact play a role. On the other hand, if liquidated damages might not even be assessed in
Employees, then it appears that this is totally superfluous as a grounds for distinguishing it
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JUSTICE MARSHALL'S CONCURRING OPINION: AN
ATTEMPT TO ,CLARIFY
The concurring opinion of Justice Marshal1 95 attempts to an-
swer the potential question of whether there will be any forum
available for the resolution of the petitioners' claim against the State
of Missouri, and it tries to differentiate between the separate con-
cepts inherent in the Eleventh Amendment and common law gov-
ernmental immunity. 96 Instead of searching for congressional intent
to create a Parden-type waiver of immunity, Justice Marshall
looked for voluntary action on the part of the state which would
indicate the state's consent to federal jurisdiction. 97 For purposes of
analysis, Justice Marshall's opinion might be characterized as seek-
ing to answer four rather than two questions. First, did Congress
intend to lift the states' sovereign immunity with which they might
otherwise seek to defend against an FLSA suit in a state proceeding?
Second, assuming this intent, were they constitutionally empowered
to do so? Third, did Congress intend to make the states amenable to
-suit in the federal courts under the 1966 amendments? Fourth, were
they constitutionally endowed with the power to bring about this
result as well?
The first two questions are answered affirmatively. Although
sovereign immunity was an absolute bar to any suit prior to the
ratification of the Constitution, this common law insulation was
modified to the extent that it conflicted with the supreme powers
delegated to Congress, including the power to regulate commerce
under the commerce clause. Mai.shall portrayed Parden as a
reaffirmation of this concept. 98
 Therefore, Congress has the power
to lift a state's sovereign immunity when it is acting under its
mandate to regulate commerce. This would indicate that the com-
mon law doctrine would not be available to the state in a state court
proceeding; as far as the federal courts are concerned, the Eleventh
Amendment bar must still be dealt with.
Thus, Justice Marshall perceived a separate problem of locating
the proper forum for resolving this dispute. Although there is no
common law immunity remaining, the _proper forum question re-
mains, "[b]ecause of the problems of federalism inherent in making
one sovereign appear against its will in the courts of the other." 99
Justice Marshall concluded that the e federal courts will not be avail-
able. His reasoning assumes that the root of the jurisdictional bar is
in Article III, clause 2; he claimed that federal jurisdiction for
from Parden. The answer probably lies in the financial condition of the wronged employee
rather than the degree of guilt of the employer—if discretion is a factor.
95 411 U.S. at 287 (concurring opinion).
96
 Id. (concurring opinion).
97
 Id. at 296 (concurring opinion).
98 Id. at 288 (concurring opinion).
99 Id. at 294 (concurring opinion).
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"controversies between a state and citizens of another state"100 was
never intended to "provide a mechanism for making states unwilling
defendants in federal court." 101 Therefore, he characterized Chisolm
v. Georgial° 2 as a judicial error and the Eleventh Amendment as an
expedient for correcting it. Thus, the states had no general common
law immunity, but retained the jurisdictional immunity from suit in
federal court, absent consent, as extended to this situation by Hans
v. Louisiana. 1 °3
Justice Marshall reluctantly recognized that there are some
instances wherein Congress may confront the states with a Parden-
type choice. However, he contended that Congress cannot do this in
every instance; Parden reaches the "outer limit of the sort of volun-
tary choice which we generally associate with the concept of con-
stitutional waiver." 1 " Since the FELA was already operative when
Alabama chose to engage in the railroad business, it can be held to
have consented somewhat voluntarily to the - jurisdiction of the fed-
eral court; it had "legal notice." 105 On the other hand, Missouri had
been engaged in the operation of state schools and hospitals for
many years before the enactment of the 1966 amendments, and
therefore, it had no choice at all. For Justice Marshall the difference
was that of choosing to enter a regulated field as in Parden, and
having to give up already functioning state activities upon passage
of certain legislation as in Employees. Apparently unhappy with the
implied waiver theory pronounced in Parden, he refused to dilute
"voluntariness" any further. Since in Employees there was not even
"legal" notice given to Missouri, it will not be held to have waived
its immunity. He therefore concluded that even though Congress did
intend to confront the states with a Parden type choice, here it is not
empowered to do so.'°6
By proposing to answer these four questions instead of the two
with which the majority dealt, Justice Marshall seemingly dis-
covered the solution to the potential problem of a right without a
remedy. Since the Eleventh Amendment is merely a jurisdictional
bar regulating the forum into which a state may be brought as a
defendant, the state courts will be "courts of competent jurisdic-
tion." Because the federal law stands as the supreme law of the
land, the state courts have an independent constitutional obligation
to enforce it, even if it conflicts with state policy. And since the
1°° For the text of the Eleventh Amendment, see note 3 supra. See also U.S. Const. art.
III, § 2.
1 ° 1 411 U.S. at 292 (concurring opinion).
102 2 U.S. (2 Da11.) 419 (1793).
1 °3 134 U.S. 1 (1890).
104 411 U.S. at 296 (concurring opinion).
105 Id. (concurring opinion).
106
 Assuming that the Court felt it necessary to limit the Pruden holding, it is submitted
that Justice Marshall's delineation is more reasonable than the majority's basis, which appears
to turn on congressional intent. See note 73 supra.
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states have already surrendered their sovereign immunity to the
extent that they granted Congress the power to regulate commerce,
the common law doctrine will be no defense if a FLSA suit is
brought against a state in its own state courts. Thus, Marshall
believed that the Supreme Court's, decision merely regulates the
forum in which a FLSA suit may be brought. There are two types of
immunity, and there is a necessity for finding a waiver of each
before the federal courts will be accessible for suits against a state.
Sovereign immunity 'has been waived by ratification of the com-
merce clause; however, any action less voluntary than the activity in
Parden will not serve to waive the Eleventh Amendment immunity.
This view reflects Justice Marshall's' concern for the preservation of
the federal scheme.
As a practical matter, he has delineated the course of conduct
which would probably enable the petitioners to recover: the suit
should first be brought in the state courts; since the Eleventh
Amendment is merely jurisdictional and is totally silent to claims
against a state in its own court, the suit would have to be enter-
tained in the state forum. If the state court were to accept a state
defense of sovereign immunity, then supposedly the suit could be
brought on appeal to the Supreme Court of the United States.
There are several questions raised by Marshall's concurring
opinion. First, was voluntary w aiver even a consideration in
Parden?'" Parden does not hold that there must be ari- express
indication given to the states by Congress that they have been given
the choice of either forgoing the regulated activity or submitting to
the jurisdiction of the federal courts. That was the argument ad-
vanced by the minority in that case, and the majority rejected it.
Rather, Parden seems to indicate that it is the state's duty to
discover whether the field which it seeks to enter has been subject to
congressional regulation. As has been seen, the FELA legislation did
not speak directly to the states; it merely held that "any common
carrier in interstate commerce would be liable.” 108 If an express
congressional directive had been found to be necessary by the Par-
den Court, it would be extremely doubtful that the claimants in that
case would have succeeded. Parden holds that "by thereafter operat-
ing a railroad, Alabama must be taken to have accepted that condi-
tion and thus have consented to suit."'" There is no language
which implies that a state must be notified as - to the fact that it must
make a choice; the conscious choice was already made when the
107 Although Justice Marshall began by discussing "legal notice," he then talked in terms
of "voluntary choice," which is generally associated with constitutional waiver. Since constitu-
tional waiver usually involves a "knowing and intelligent" waiver, it connotes a far greater
degree of voluntariness than is embodied in the; term "legal notice," which arises by mere
operation of law. Therefore, Justice Marshall was actually requiring voluntary choice, not
legal notice, when he sought to distinguish Employees from Parden.
10 See text following note 68 supra.
1°9 377 U.S. at 192,
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states ratified the Constitution. By ratification, the states empow-
ered Congress to override certain state interests, including, as Par-
den teaches, the state interest of immunity from suit in a federal
forum. Voluntary choice is not required by Parden; as the Parden
dissent properly recognized, the majority held in that- case that
"waiver of a constitutional privilege [immunity] need be neither
knowing nor intelligent."'" Thus, Justice Marshall's search for "the
sort of voluntary choice which we generally associate with the
concept of constitutional waiver"" 1
 is not grounded in the apparent
holding of Parden, and it can only be taken as an expression of his
distaste for the concept of implied waiver.
Secondly, assuming that voluntariness is indeed the test for
determining implied waiver, was there anything in the facts of
Parden which indicates a degree of-voluntariness which was lacking
in Employees? While the FELA never even addressed itself to the
states, the 1966 FLSA amendments were enacted for the primary
purpoie of bringing the states within, the purview of the Act. There-
fore, it cannot be said that Alabama was warned by the Congress
that it would have to consciously choose between forgoing the
activity or being amenable to suit. Moreover, in Parden the State of
Alabama argued that it was totally unconscious of its having made a
choice to submit to federal jurisdiction under the FELA. As the
Tenth Circuit pointed out in Briggs, Alabama contended in Parden
that "the State did not intend to waive its immunity or knoW that
such a waiver would result."" 2
 Thus, although Alabama had legal
notice of its being confronted by Congress with the choice of submit-
ting to federal 'jurisdiction or forgoing the activity, while in Em-
ployees Missouri received no such notice, there was nothing that
Alabama did that made its waiver of immunity any more voluntary
than the actions of Missouri upon which the appellants' case was
based.
While Justice Marshall's attempt to associate legal notice with
vollintariness appears tenuous on the facts of Parden, his argument
that "legal notice" is required is valid and somewhat compelling. He
perceived legal notice as being the difference between the choice of
initiating an activity in the face of amenability to a federal suit
(Parden) and dismantling a state enterprise to avoid suit in a federalforum {Employees). This distinction did not have to be dealt with by
the Parden court, but it would have supplied a rational basis for the
majority decision in Employees..Regrettably, the majority chose to
ignore it. I 13
10
 Id. at 200 (dissenting opinion).
"I 411 .
 U.S. at 296 (concurring opinion).
112 Briggs, 424 F.2d at 134.
113
 While Justice Marshall would apparently limit Pardon to situations where there was
at least legal notice, the majority would do so on the basis of congressional intent. See notes
73 .and 106 supra.
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JUSTICE BRENNAN'S DISSENT
In his dissent" 4 Justice Brennan expressed his total inability to
comprehend the majority's reading of Parden. He viewed that case
as dealing solely with sovereign immunity; thus Parden holds that a
state, by ratifying the commerce: clause, has surrendered its
sovereign immunity, and Congress can therefore compel the state to
appear as a defendant in a federal tribunal." 5 He argued that only
the dissent in Parden would require. a clear congressional directive
that the state be amenable to suit; to him, the majority was saying
that there was no immunity left to be lifted, and therefore Congress
could remain silent on that issue if it so desired. Further, even
assuming that congressional intent is of controlling importance, he
cogently underscored the fact that the intent is eminently clearer in
the 1966 amendments than in the FELA.
To understand Justice Brennan's view of the proper disposition
of this case, one must firstrealize that Brennan viewed the Eleventh
Amendment as being explicit in its limitation upon the federal
judicial power. Therefore, the Eleventh Amendment has no applica-
tion whatsoever in cases such as Parden and Employees where' the
state is sued in federal court by its ; own citizens. Contrary to the
Hans court which assumed that the Eleventh Amendment was
intended to incorporate the doctrine of sovereign immunity, Justice
Brennan believed that the framers of the amendment did not aim to
"ensconce" this concept. 16 According to thiS view, the Eleventh
Amendment was an express limitation upon the federal judiciary
enacted to meet the contingencies resulting from Chisholm—i.e., the
danger of making a state an unwilling defendant in aforeign federal
forum, This danger did not exist when the state was sued by one of
its citizens. By relying on the view that the Eleventh Amendment
was based on sovereign immunity, the Hans Court used the concept
of sovereign immunity to extend the Eleventh Amendment bar to
situations where the citizens of a state sue their own state in federal
court. However, because the Hani Court should not have been
extending the amendment to this situation, the case can be viewed
only as a sovereign immunity case, separate and apart from the
Eleventh Amendment. By characterizing Hans in this manner and
by reading Parden to hold that sovereign immunity has been sur-
rendered by the states upon ratification- of the commerce clause,
Justice Brennan concluded that there is nothing to impede the
federal courts in the exercise of their jurisdiction.
By adopting this view, Justice Brennan also found it impossible
to accept Justice Marshall's view that the Eleventh Amendment will
serve only to regulate the forum in ' which the actidn is brought. If
14 411 U.S. at 298 (dissenting opinion).
1 " Id. at 300-01 (dissenting opinion),
116
 Id. at 309 (dissenting opinion).
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this suit is characterized as being concerned merely with sovereign
immunity, then this suit can either be brought in both state and
federal court or else it can be brought in neither. If sovereign
immunity has been waived, then both. the state courts and the
federal courts will be courts of competent jurisdiction for purposes
of this action; if, on the other hand, immunity has not been
waived—as the majority opinion appears to state—neither the state
courts nor the federal courts will be accessible to the plaintiffs.
There is one basic flaw in Justice Brennan's simple solution to
the problems raised by this case, and it is the mirror image of the
weakness of the majority view. That is, while the majority has
perpetuated the confusion surrounding the two doctrines in order to
justify their conclusion, Justice Brennan ignored the long line of
case law which has viewed Hans to be an extension of the Eleventh
Amendment bar to the Parden and Employees situations as well.
Moreover, Parden cannot be dismissed as a pure sovereign immu-
nity case. Closer scrutiny of that case reveals that the Court there
considered the question of "the [sovereign] immunity doctrine, as
embodied in the Eleventh Amendment." 117 Thus, the two concepts
were not clearly distinguished there; the Parden Court did not feel
that it was dealing with a pure sovereign immunity case. If it were
such a case, then there would be no need for the implied waiver
theory; sovereign immunity was surrendered by the states having
ratified the commerce clause. Justice Brennan can arrive at his
dissenting view only by refusing to recognize the manner in which
the Court has dealt with the two concepts over the course of con-
stitutional history.
CONCLUSION
It appears from the majority opinion that the Court was some-
what uncomfortable with the implications of the doctrine of implied
waiver as pronounced in Parden. Employees, therefore, can be
viewed as an attempt to circumvent the holding of the Parden case
without overruling it. The Court has chosen to distinguish it from
Employees on what are submitted to be tenuous grounds. If the
majority is viewed as seeking to answer only one question—whether
Congress intended to confront the states with a Parden-type choice
(as Justice Brennan sees it)-=then all that remains for Congress to do
is expressly to direct that the defense of governmental immunity
cannot be invoked. However, it is submitted that Justice Douglas
was saying more: when the state activity is governmental rather
than proprietary and when compliance with the congressional
enactment involves expenditures of large amounts of state revenues,
then the Supreme Court will not be ready to recognize a Parden-
type implied waiver of immunity.
117
 377 U.S. at 192,
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Justice Marshall, on the other hand, was not concerned with
the cost of compliance or the governmental-proprietary distinction.
He was more concerned with the requirement that there be some
semblance of voluntariness in a court-found waiver. As long as the
state could have known of the congressional regulation before it
decided to engage in the activity, he will be ready to find waiver.
On the other hand, if the state is already engaged in the activity
before the enactment of the legislation, he would presumably re-
quire the state to submit expressly to the jurisdiction of the federal
courts.
Either of these two views will, serve to restrict the power of
Congress to regulate state activity in relation to private citizens. In
Wirtz the Court rejected attempts to 'overturn the 1966 amendments
to the FLSA. It held ,
 that Congress had acted within its delegated
powers under the commerce clause, and it could therefore override
countervailing state interests. In Employees, however, the Court
refused to open a federal forum for enforcement of those
constitutionally-created rights; it arrived at this conclusion by ac-
cepting the very same arguments which it had previously dismissed
in Wirtz. Without a remedy, the rights. created by the 1966 amend-
ments and the Supreme Court decision recognizing their constitu-
tionality are both effectively emasculated. Thus, the question re-
mains unanswered as to whether Congress can in any way bring
employer-states- into federal court when the activity in which they
are engaged is more than a small, state-owned railroad operated for
a profit. According to Justice Marshall's view, the federal courts
cannot be made accessible to wronged employees as long as their
employer-state had already initiated the activity before the enact-
ment of the federal legislation. Thus, any state now engaged in a
certain employment activity is beyond the reach of any new congres-
sional statutory regulation which seeks to make them subject to suit
in federal court.
Although the majority's rationale is somewhat dubious, the
most distressing aspect of this decision is that the majority has not
really dealt with the fact that they might have created a right
without a remedy. The section 16(c) suit will be of negligible benefit
to state employees. It is, of course, ,possible that the 1966 amend-
ments and the Wirtz decision will not be rendered nugatory if the
state courts are accessible for enforcement of the rights which they
created and recognized as valid. Although the Court claims that
"arguably this permits suits in the Missouri courts," 1 I 8 such a result
is almost impossible to predict becatise of the manner in which the
majority refused to disentangle the two doctrines of sovereign im-
munity and the Eleventh Amendment. Justice Douglas concludes
that "[One history and tradition of the Eleventh Amendment indi-
cate that by reason of that barrier, a federal court is not competent
118 411 U.S. at 288 (concurring opinion).
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to render judgment against a non-consenting state."'" But the
history and tradition of the Eleventh Amendment have become
hopelessly intertwined with the history and tradition of sovereign
immunity. Needless to say, the blame for that confusion cannot be
placed on the shoulders of the Employees Court. Nevertheless, little
was done to alleviate that confusion, and what is more crucial is
that the Court's failure to hold explicitly that this suit was blocked
either by a jurisdictional characterization of the Eleventh Amend-
ment or by sovereign immunity makes it difficult to determine
whether the state courts have an independent duty to entertain this
suit. If the majority opinion is read, as it very well might be, to hold
that there has been no waiver of sovereign immunity in accordance
with the,Parden decision, then one Might conclude that states will
never successfully be forced to comply with the 1966 amendments to
the FLSA, because the question of waiver of sovereign immunity "is
one of federal law . . . whenever the waiver is asserted to arise from
an act done by the State within the realm of Congressional regula-
tion . . . ." 1 " Thus, if this holding is based upon a finding of no
waiver of sovereign immunity, then the petitioners, when seeking
redress in the state courts, would be effectively blocked by the
Supreme Court's finding. Without the benefit of any Supreme Court
directive (through dictum or otherwise), the state courts might feel
free to similarly accept the defense of state immunity and to deny
the employees recoveiy in that forum as well. If this were the'result,
the petitioners would have to rest their hopes for recovery upon a
state legislatiVe enactment which would independently lift the pro-
tective veil of sovereign immunity. That would be expecting too
much, for that state legislature isi in reality, the very same employer
who was not willing to pay the petitioners time-and-a-half for over-
time in the first place. There would be little compulsion for the
states to reassess that policy, especially in light of their knowledge
that the federal courts are inaccessible for enforcement of the em-
ployees' claim. The, majority opinion could be read to hold that
there is indeed a valid congressionally created right without any
remedy—except for that fortunite minority which succeeds in hav-
ing the Secretary of Labor try their cases: Because of the lack of
clarity in the majority opinion, it remains to be seen whether the
state courts will be responsive to employee suits under the 1966
amendments to the FLSA.
MARSHALL F. NEWMAN
19 Id. at 284.
•	 12° Parden,i 377 U.S. at 196.
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